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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 v.
MICHAEL KOBOLD,
               Appellant
 ____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No.: 03-cr-00010 
District Judge: Honorable Joy F. Conti
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 13, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, ROSENN, and BECKER, Circuit Judges
(Filed        December 23, 2004               )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Michael Kobold (“Kobold”) was tried to a jury in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and convicted on one count of
willfully making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  On this timely
2appeal, Kobold raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether he was unduly prejudiced by the closing
statements of his co-defendant’s counsel; and (3) whether his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to move for a judgment of acquittal and failing
to object to the closing remarks of co-defendant’s counsel.  We affirm the judgment of
conviction and sentence imposed by the District Court.  
I.
Because the facts are known to the parties and counsel, we briefly refer only to the
salient facts pertinent to the issues raised.  Kobold, born and raised abroad, was educated
internationally.  In 2002, he earned a bachelor of science degree in economics from
Carnegie Mellon University, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Kobold operates a company
that he founded, which designs and manufactures watches.  He also works in his father’s
business, which designs and manufactures instruments for industrial applications.  He
also presides over a non-profit organization of his creation, the Kobold Foundation.
Although not a law enforcement officer, Kobold apparently has an interest in law
enforcement.  His conviction stems from his illicit use of a constable’s badge to gain
access to a secured area of the Pittsburgh International Airport reserved for ticketed
passengers only.  When questioned by a federal customs inspector about his presence in
this area without a ticket,  Kobold produced a Pennsylvania constable’s badge, and
responded that he was a Pennsylvania constable.  He explained that he had recently lost
3his constable’s identification and Pennsylvania driver’s license in the course of making an
arrest.
II.
Kobold concedes that he has failed to preserve his first two claims that: (1) the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and (2) the closing statements of co-
defendant’s counsel were unduly prejudicial.  Thus, we review these claims for plain
error.  United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 466-67 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 309 (3d Cir. 1989).  To demonstrate plain error, Kobold must
show that: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear; (3) it affected “substantial
rights”; and (4) it “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (citations
omitted).  Kobold has not satisfied this burden.
We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when we consider whether
a jury verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence.  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d
180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998).  The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, and we will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. (quoting United States
v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996), in turn quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)) (internal citation omitted).  The evidence against Kobold, including his
own admissions, is more than sufficient to support the jury verdict.  It is undisputed that
4Kobold was never actually a constable or deputy constable.  It is also undisputed that
Kobold never possessed a Pennsylvania driver’s license.  At trial, Kobold admitted that he
identified himself as a law enforcement officer, displayed his constable’s badge, and
explained that he lost his constable’s identification while effectuating an arrest.  Kobold
denied telling the customs inspector that he had a Pennsylvania driver’s license, but
admitted that he falsely told the inspector that he misplaced his driver’s license.  Other
evidence produced at trial, including the testimony of the federal customs inspector who
questioned Kobold, amply supports the jury’s guilty verdict.  
Further, because the jury was presented with sufficient evidence of Kobold’s
guilt, we reject his claim that he suffered undue prejudice as a result of the closing
remarks of counsel for his co-defendant.
Kobold also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  As a
general rule, we will not entertain ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct
review.  Rather, we “defer the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral
attack,” so that the record can be adequately developed with facts necessary to decide
such claims.  United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003); see also
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003).  Therefore, Kobold’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim must abide the determination of the court in the event he
raises it in a collateral proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
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